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 1 
Preface 
 
In the first two chapters of this thesis I outline a theoretical approach to 
international society and international order. In chapters three and four I examine the 
Vienna and Versailles systems using the tools and terms of the theory here elaborated. 
These systems serve to illustrate the theory: they test its coherence and relevance; they do 
not test hypotheses. In the fifth chapter I conclude with a brief application of this 
approach to the modern Liberal order and a summary of the major theoretical points. 
Finally, because definitions serve an essential function to this thesis, I include an 
appendix of the important terms used throughout the text. An annotated bibliography 
follows. 
In this thesis my main purpose has been to lay out a self-consistent framework 
and set of definitions to understand great power relations. This work is synthetic, seeking 
to weave into a single whole disparate explanations of related phenomena.  
 Most importantly, this work offers a theory of great power relations. I deal only 
with politics in anarchy; I do not attempt to explain regional politics or hierarchical 
relations between great and minor powers. Although this omission makes the theory 
incomplete, those who suggest that we should move to an understanding of international 
politics on the basis of authority are mistaken. We do not yet have a sound theory of great 
powers in anarchy. If we do not understand the simplest aspect of international politics, 
we cannot hope to understand the more complex. Until we understand great power 
politics in the core, we will never understand regional politics on the periphery.  
 2 
 The model here expounded is one of static order. The effects of power and 
ideological transition on order are an interesting issue, for which I hope to have provided 
some analytical tools, but ultimately I do not address them in this thesis.  
 Finally, because the purpose of political science is not only to help us understand 
but also to help us influence events, I hope that these arguments demonstrate a general 
prescription for the maintenance (or destruction) of international order. 
 3 
1 
Without a city, man is either a beast or a god  
    –Aristotle 
 
There is no city of states. States exist in anarchy, an existence they cannot escape. 
But unlike among men, anarchy among states is not a state of war—or at least, it does not 
have to be. This thesis is a theory of great power relations, explaining the conditions of 
major power war and, therefore, of major power peace. It shows how states, though 
trapped in anarchy, escape the State of Nature for something higher, how they preserve 
this higher State, and how this higher State collapses. It shows how Artificial Man 
necessarily survives in an inescapable anarchy, and how that same mortal god, 
unconstrained by the limitations of natural men, achieves society without government. It 
argues that this society cannot endure of its own, but that only an international order 
preserves this society; that this order comprises three essential elements, a balance of 
power, a legitimating principle, and a set of rules; that there is no structural imperative 
for an international order to emerge; that instead, the emergence of an order is contingent 
upon the statesmen of a time, and that the character of the order is determined largely by 
the vagaries of an historical moment; that once established the stability of an order is 
structurally determined; and that the creation or preservation of international order must 
precede virtually all other international goals. This is the story of politics among the 
earthly powers, of gods and beasts and the choice between two worlds.  
 
 4 
Anarchy and the Structure of International Relations 
Whatever else changes in world politics, anarchy remains, and however 
international relations vary they have at their core this common foundation. Certain 
consequences follow necessarily from anarchy, including the recurrence of the balance of 
power; yet states are unlike men, and so anarchy among states need not lead to war. 
Ultimately, though anarchy is the eternal constraint of international politics, it is also the 
wellspring of all international opportunity. Whether states seize this opportunity for peace 
or for war is the choice of men.   
 
Anarchy Among Men and Anarchy Among States 
Politics among states necessarily occur in anarchy.1 They cannot escape this 
condition: to surrender their sovereignty surrenders their existence. 2 Indeed, for a state to 
surrender sovereignty is not only suicide: it denies its fundamental identity.3  
Whether among men or among states, anarchy is the same: in both, it is the 
absence of hierarchy, nothing more. But the implication of anarchy among states differs 
from anarchy amongst individuals. Among men, anarchy results in government, the 
                                                 
1
 This thesis is about great powers, and precisely these are meant by the term state. In this discussion the 
term state should not be read to include minor powers, pseudo-states or anything similar. Indeed, lesser 
states exist in a semblance of hierarchy—Wight (1977) calls these relations a suzerain-state system; see 
also Lake (2009)—and so a discussion of politics in anarchy cannot apply to them. Furthermore, I use the 
term to denote an entity exercising ultimate authority over a particular realm of politics. That realm need be 
neither geographical nor vast; hence, in this discussion both 5th-century Athens and 18th-century France are 
categorized as states. Therefore, the term should not be taken to mean anything peculiar to post-
Westphalian international relations, least of all as shorthand for the territorially sovereign state. David A. 
Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Martin Wight, Systems 
of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977). 
2
 “The sovereign must remain absolutely authoritative or it cannot perform its necessary role.” Michael C. 
Williams, “Hobbes and international relations: a reconsideration,” International Organization 50.2 (1996): 
229.  
3
 This point is Hobbes’s. Mark Heller puts it well: “the function of the state and its life are 
coterminous…the survival of the state must be a ‘necessary value’ for it, and death must be its ultimate 
aversion. As an artificial creation of man, it must survive in order to attain its objective.” Mark A. Heller, 
“The Use & Abuse of Hobbes: The State of Nature in International Relations,” Polity 13.1 (1980): 27.  
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surrender of absolute liberty, personal sovereignty, to gain security. But states do not 
surrender their sovereignty, and world government does not emerge. Because anarchy is 
the same, these divergent consequences must stem from a difference in the units, that is, 
from the difference between men and states.  
In anarchy men are absolutely insecure, an existence arising out of the universal 
vulnerability and inherent equality of human beings.4 But states cannot die, they need not 
sleep, and they are not equal.5 Therefore, unlike men, in anarchy states are not absolutely 
insecure; in fact, the curse of international relations is that every state enjoys the 
possibility of achieving absolute security, i.e. hegemony. The potential to realize this goal 
is the source of all major war. 
Here, then, is the crucial difference between Hobbesian and international anarchy: 
for men, anarchy is a state of war, but they can escape it through government; for states, 
anarchy is not necessarily a state of war, but it permits no escape.6 
 
                                                 
4
 The contention that men are ultimately equal opens the thirteenth chapter of Leviathan: “when all is 
reckoned together the difference between man and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can 
thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the 
strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New 
York: Barnes & Noble, 2004), 75. 
5
 Political Theorists have long observed these differences between Hobbesian and international anarchy; 
they have also often criticized overly simple interpretations of Hobbes in the IR literature. See Heller 
(1980); Williams (1996). 
6
 Martin Wight observes that “[i]nternational anarchy is the one manifestation of the state of nature that is 
not intolerable.” Martin Wight, “Why is there no International Theory?,” in Diplomatic Investigations: 
Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966), 31. 
 6 
The Recurrence of the Balance of Power  
Competition in anarchy must result either in a balance of power7 or in hegemony.8 
Among states there can be no appeal to authority: anarchy ensures that the international 
arena is a self-help system. Every state desires its own security, the most certain bulwark 
of which is the achievement of hegemony. But hegemony and the absolute security of 
one state imply the absolute insecurity for all others. Unable to depend upon others’ 
benevolence, each state must ensure that nothing can threaten its existence. States will 
therefore seek to maximize their power in an attempt to achieve hegemony while 
preventing other states from achieving the same goal. As all states—or at least, those 
states that survive—attempt hegemony and foil each others’ efforts, a balance of power 
emerges.9 
 Still, states sometimes miscalculate. Indeed, in a world of perfect information and 
rationality, war would never occur.10 But states do not perfectly perceive their world, and 
they operate under chronically incomplete information; moreover, not only do leaders’ 
incentives not always coincide with the national interest, more often than not they are 
                                                 
7
 The enunciation of an unimpeachable definition of the balance of power has notoriously eluded theorists 
of international politics. Indeed, in his Theory Waltz noted that by some counts scholars employed the 
phrase in at least eight different ways. Three decades have only multiplied the uses of the ubiquitous term. 
Nonetheless, this failure signifies not the bankruptcy of the concept but rather its indispensability; the 
confusion surrounding the balance of power does not demean its theoretical merits. Here I define it as the 
neutralization of capabilities—that is, states cease to effect interests wherever there is a balance of power. 
For further clarification, see Appendix A. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979), 117. 
8
 This thesis does not deal with hegemony and so in these chapters I omit all further discussion of it. 
9
 This argument is the core of the neorealist approach to international relations, particularly that of 
offensive realism. I briefly recapitulate it here as it undergirds the theoretical frame I elaborate. See Waltz 
(1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2001). 
NB: in international society the mutual respect of primary goals implies that states do not regard 
themselves as existentially vulnerable; therefore, the points of neorealism, particularly offensive realism, do 
not obtain in international society. Once states form an international society and pursue goals beyond 
elementary ones, interstate politics cease to be zero-sum.  
10
 See James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49.3 (1995); Erik 
Gartzke, “War is in the Error Term,” International Organization 53.3 (1999).  
 7 
simply incompetent.11 Because of the limitations of human perception, balances of power 
tend to collapse. The first principle of international politics, therefore, is that anarchy 
causes balances of power to recur.12  
 
International Society 
In a balance of power, no state can infringe the elementary goals of other states—
that is, with its capabilities neutralized a state is unable to threaten another’s existence. 
This incapacity is the foundation of all diplomacy and international covenants.13 Most 
importantly, this powerlessness is the first precondition of international peace.14 
 
The Emergence of International Society 
The balance of power guarantees the elementary goals of states and thereby 
eliminates the structural imperative to pursue hegemony.15  With their primary goals 
                                                 
11
 Such widespread incompetence should not necessarily be viewed in an unfavorable light: after all, were 
states not beset by such a wide and diverse multitudity of problematic conditions and circumstances, 
politics would be almost as dull as economics.  
12
 The recurrence of a balance of power implies neither that a balance always exists nor that states 
consciously balance each other. Like the elimination of profits in the market, the balance of power is often 
the unintended consequence of state interaction. The absence of a balancer or even of a consciousness of 
the balance does not disprove the claim. 
13
 That the balance of power underpins international society is essential to Bull’s argument: “Both general 
and local balances of power, where they have existed, have provided the conditions in which other 
institutions on which international order depends (diplomacy, war, international law, great power 
management) have been able to operate.” Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 107. By contrast, Little has reversed the order of 
causation when he asserts “the systematic development of diplomacy as a European institution represented 
an essential structure underpinning the formation of the balance of power.” Richard Little, The Balance of 
Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 153.  
14
 Major war is impossible in a state of peace. Major war threatens the survival of at least one antagonist; 
but in international society, states respect the elementary goals (including survival) of other states; therefore, 
major war cannot occur within an international society. Minor wars may occur as tools of negotiation or 
honor, but major war is logically impossible. 
15
 Said again, the balance of power can uncertainly extend the shadow of the future such that international 
relations transition from a prisoner’s dilemma to a stag hunt, with international politics taking on the 
characteristics of a coordination game. 
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achieved, states are then able to pursue goals beyond mere aggrandizement. Once power 
is balanced, states need not seek it. They may still pursue power: after all, hegemony 
affords benefits beyond absolute security, and nothing in the structure of international 
relations can drive a state to anything more than a de facto recognition of others’ 
elementary goals.16 
Structure creates the possibility of international society, yet no distribution of 
capabilities, interests, or perceptions can of itself generate one. But, if states—or rather, 
statesmen—recognize that coexistence is mutually beneficial, that by maintaining 
peaceful relations they can pursue other aims, and if the realization of these aims 
outweighs the possibility of achieving hegemony, then they will.17 International society 
allows states to pursue goals beyond simple survival; it gives states the chance not only to 
live, but to live well.18  
                                                 
16
 Third image variables cannot explain the emergence of international society. Only 2nd and 1st-level 
explanations that deal with state preferences and individual behaviour can help to predict when 
international society will arise. 
17
 Theories of the emergence of international society are universally fuzzy and vacuous. The best of which I 
know, and the one from which I have primarily drawn this argument, is Barry Buzan’s marriage of the 
English school with structural realism, wherein he argues that “at some point the regularity and intensity of 
[states’] interactions will virtually force the development of a degree of recognition and accommodation 
among them…Once the balance of power is recognized as a possible basis for order, rather than being, like 
the security dilemma, simply an automatic consequence or mechanism of the anarchic system, then the 
great powers can, if they agree, consciously manage their relations to preserve a balance.” Barry Buzan, 
“From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the 
English school,” International Organization 47.3 (1993): 334, 348. Still, Buzan commits the same error 
against which Waltz warns in his Theory of International Politics, i.e. wishing final causes were efficient 
does not make them so: to wit, Buzan asserts “a common desire for order is the minimum necessary 
condition to begin the evolution of international society along gesellschaft lines,” but he never shows why 
anything “must eventually generate” an international society. Buzan, 334, 336.  
18
 In the English School, “the idea of ‘International Society’ civilizes an otherwise dismal vision of a world 
of power-seeking states, which would be otherwise moderated in their impulses and appetites only by such 
transitory and tenuous ‘balances of power’ as may wax and wane in the international affairs of human 
kind.” R.J. Barry Jones, “The English School and the Construction of International Society,” in 
International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. B.A. Roberson (London: 
Continuum, 2002): 241.  
 9 
International society emerges when states forego the possibility of achieving 
absolute security in order to enjoy the benefits of peace.19 It is defined20 simply as states’ 
mutual respect for elementary goals.21  
Within the international system, states which respect the elementary goals of 
others are status quo states; those which do not are revisionist states.22 Put another way, a 
revisionist state will attempt to realize gains which would overthrow the balance of 
power; a status quo state will attempt to realize gains which would not overthrow the 
balance of power.23 Since revisionist states would realize gains despite the elementary 
needs of other states, they lie outside international society. 
 
                                                 
19
 Just as a state of war does not imply actual armed conflict, so too a state of peace does not imply 
harmony and goodwill among nations. Rather, as the state of war is characterized by the ever-present threat 
of war, the state of peace is characterized by its absence. In a state of peace—that is, in an international 
society—states treat the elementary goals of other states as given and inviolable. They may not like each 
other, but they respect each other’s right to exist. 
20
 This definition differs not extraordinarily from that offered in most English School accounts, including 
Bull, who argues a “society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of 
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to 
be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common 
institutions,” Bull, 13. Primarily, the definition I offer is simpler and does not rely upon plumbing state 
consciousness to understand how they conceive themselves; but in the sense that international society 
involves those states who recognize common limits to international action, these definitions accord 
precisely.  
21
 Since Westphalia international society has been understood almost exclusively as states’ mutual 
recognition of each others’ territorial sovereignty. See for instance Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical 
Society, 13. 
22
 The use of these terms, or variants thereof, dates back to classical realism: Morgenthau distinguished 
status quo from imperialist states, and his chief distinction—that status quo states pursue security, 
revisionist states, power—I have here sustained, Morgenthau 50;  Kissinger distinguished status quo from 
revolutionary states, Kissinger (1964); see also Carr, 51. Since then, scholars have used the terms in a 
sundry of ways; I have tried to capture the essence of the most common usage within the theoretical 
framework here advanced. In addition, I have not adopted the practice of identifying a third class of states, 
sometimes called isolationist or recluse states—see Davidson (2006)—as these are more a subcategory of 
status quo states than a class in their own right.  
23
 Gains realized by status quo states may alter the balance of power—that is, alter states’ relative power—
but they may not alter the balance such that the survival of any state is in jeopardy. International society 
depends upon the existence of a balance of power, not its constancy.  
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The Weakness of International Society 
By itself, international society is not a state of equilibrium. International society 
emerges out of a fortuitous balance of power, but states are prone to miscalculate, and no 
state can defend society.24 Moreover, if ever a state perceives the capability to achieve 
hegemony, it will do so, since the benefits of hegemony are always more than those of 
social coexistence. If the balance collapses, whether in reality or only in the perceptions 
of some states, society must collapse as well: if a balance no longer safeguards a states’ 
elementary goals, that state must once again pursue hegemony, for, regardless of how 
happily collegial society has become, no state can afford to trust the good intentions of 
another.  
 Still, international society will not disintegrate unless a revisionist state acts to 
overthrow it; that is, a revisionist challenge is the efficient cause of social collapse.25 
Statesmen from Mazarin to Bismarck have sought to preserve international society 
despite their countries’ rising power, maintaining them as satiated states. Yet, ultimately 
the opportunity for aggrandizement will prove stronger: the state will turn to revisionism 
after the removal of this final restraint, whether upon the leader’s death or by his forced 
ouster from office. By itself, international society cannot long withstand changes in the 
distribution of power. 26  
                                                 
24
 Anarchy cannot be escaped, and international relations are always a self-help system; “with each country 
constrained to take care of itself, no one can take care of the system.” Waltz, 109.  
25
 The peaceful resolution of the Cold War, despite the absence of an international order, can be explained 
by the absence of a revisionist state: to become revisionist, a state must desire gains it does not have; but 
the Soviet Union was a declining power, so that its current possessions in the international system always 
exceeded what it stood to gain in a revisionist conflict; in short, the USSR could gain nothing by 
overturning international society. While the Cold War set the stage for the collapse of international society, 
an efficient cause never materialized.  
26
 This section is power transition theory in a nutshell: “when a revisionist latecomer overtakes an erstwhile 
leader of the international system, war looms.” Chan, 2. 
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  International society emerges out of the de facto recognition of elementary goals 
imposed by a fortuitous balance of power. Yet, left alone frequent crises will mar 
international society; eventually, it will collapse altogether. The state of peace cannot 
sustain itself. Mortal men safeguard society with government, but world government will 
not emerge; the survival of international society, then, rests upon states and the systems 
they construct.  
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2 
Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord  
–St Augustine 
 
An international order is a configuration of states which tends to perpetuate 
international society, that is, a state of peace. It comprises three elements: a contrived 
balance of power, a set of rules, and a legitimating principle. Its construction will succeed 
insofar as statesmen abandon utopian visions for a realistic understanding of the world. 
An order will persist, and peace will persist with it, so long as a status quo alliance will 
rise to its defense. An order will collapse when any one of its elements fails. Because 
international society precedes most state goals, and because society endures only when 
supported by an international order, the first goal of foreign policy should generally be 
the maintenance of international order.  
 
 13 
The Elements of Order27 
The Contrived Balance of Power 
The fortuitous balance of power emerges out of the self-interested actions of 
states, just as in the market equilibrium emerges out of the free competition among firms. 
But the number of great powers is limited—the likeness of international politics to 
economics more nearly approximates oligopoly than perfect competition. Whereas no 
small firm can alter the market equilibrium, in international relations the actions of one or 
two great powers can destabilize the balance; consequently, unlike in the perfectly 
competitive market, the only stable balance is one which most states consciously 
contrive.28  
The contrived balance of power, then, is the conscious decision by some states to 
oppose any threat to international society, that is, to deny any state the capability or 
interest to alter international society. By definition, only status quo states will 
consciously counterbalance others. The balance of power, then, is defended by an 
alliance of status quo states. Furthermore, whereas a fortuitous balance of power reflects 
                                                 
27
 To my knowledge, a clear formulation of international order does not exist in the literature. While a topic 
much discussed, neither its elements nor even its nature have ever been precisely defined. In this chapter I 
seek to at least ameliorate this unpardonable shortcoming in IR scholarship.  
The most recent major contribution to theories of international order is After Victory, wherein Ikenberry 
distinguishes three kinds of international order: balance of power, hegemony, and constitutional. Balance of 
Power rests ultimately upon the sovereignty of states; alliances are only temporary coalitions, and as power 
shifts, so too will they. Hegemonic order creates a hierarchic structure for international relations. To the 
third order, constitutionalism, Ikenberry devotes by far the most detail; still, his arguments reduce to one 
essential, that is, constitutional orders create a mechanism of restraining power. Within the framework I 
develop here, the Balance of Power is equivalent to international politics without international society, 
whereas his vision of constitutionalism vaguely approximates the outline of order I develop here. Finally, 
we ought to reject Ikenberry’s typology, since the three (hegemony, balance of power, and constitutional) 
are not variations on a common dimension. A more useful typology would first distinguish a hierarchic 
from an anarchic realm (hegemony from a balance of power), second a social from an antagonistic 
environment, third an ordered from a disordered international system.  
28
 The distinction between a contrived and a fortuitous balance of power has a long history in the literature. 
The conception deployed here is most clearly advanced in Bull’s Anarchical Society.  
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a unintended stalemate between hegemony-seeking states, a contrived balance must 
contain at least one status quo state. 
A contrived balance is necessary to the perpetuation of international society. This 
need does not mean states will construct or maintain one. Leaders of states often willfully 
blind themselves to the necessities of peace, what Kissinger called “the petulance of 
mediocrity.”29 Moreover, no state ever defends the balance of power for its own sake, or 
even for the sake of international society; the balance holds no ideological appeal, and 
domestic audiences will not countenance the expense of blood and treasure for such wild 
abstractions as the balance of power and international society. A balance of power is 
never maintained by the demonstration of its necessity.30   
Furthermore, even if states commit to a defense of the status quo, the steps 
necessary to the preservation of international society are not always clear; indeed, “the 
danger to the equilibrium is never demonstrated until it is already overturned.”31 Without 
a clear identification of essential and nonessential interests, a state cannot determine 
whether actions, including its own, tend to support or undermine the status quo. States 
tend to miscalculate the needs of the balance of power, whether willfully or by simple 
mistake. Therefore, even a contrived balance of power is not self-sustaining; that is, left 
alone, a balance of power will eventually disintegrate.  
 
                                                 
29
 A term too utterly delightful to omit. Kissinger (1956), 275.  
30
 This argument underpins Kissinger’s analysis of Metternich’s success and Castlereagh’s failure at the 
Congress of Vienna—“equilibrium could not be achieved through a demonstration of its necessity,” 
Kissinger (1956), 272. Note that Kissinger employs the term equilibrium to denote a balance of forces, not 
as a point from which there is no incentive to deviate. See the discussion of Metternich and Castlereagh in 
chapter three. 
31
 Kissinger (1956), 274-5. Schroeder makes the point with pizzazz: “wars, like hell, usually mean truth 
seen too late.” Paul W. Schroeder, Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of 
Modern Europe (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 95.  
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Rules 
A contrived balance cannot sustain itself because threats to the balance are not 
self-evident. To distinguish threats to the balance of power, states require clear 
definitions of essential and nonessential interests; that is, states need clear rules to alert 
them to actions that threaten the status quo.32  
Rules change perceptions—that is their function. States often misperceive how to 
maintain order; rules rectify this error. Where otherwise states would not recognize when 
an action would destabilize international relations, rules regulate politics, and their 
violation signals a contempt for order and the rights of other states. In short, rules 
strengthen order inasmuch as they identify threats to international society.33 
An order which permitted no change would not long endure: power, ideas, and 
perceptions constantly fluctuate, and to exclude the possibility of realizing gains would 
drive states to revisionism. The challenge of an order, then, is not to prevent change, but 
to prevent revisionist change—that is, to prevent change that jeopardizes the existence of 
a major power. To identify revisionist threats, rules must distinguish between interests 
that are inviolable—that is, any attempt to alter them constitutes a direct threat to 
international society—and interests that are negotiable.  
In this indispensable distinction, essential interests form the core of international 
society, negotiable interests, the periphery. The core of an international order typically 
consists of the borders of all major powers and of certain minor powers, for instance the 
                                                 
32
 The presence of rules does not imply the presence of an international order; indeed, rules and 
expectations of behaviour can exist even outside international society. An international order rests not on 
the existence of rules but on the function those rules serve. 
33
 Bull notes that “Order in any society is maintained not merely by a sense of common interests in creating 
order or avoiding disorder, but by rules which spell out the kind of behaviour that is orderly.”33 The 
emphasis on the important functions rules serve also pervades the liberal literature; see for instance 
Raymond Cohen, “Rules of the Game in International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 24.1 
(1980). 
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Low Countries; necessarily, the absolute number of great powers also forms part of the 
core. As well, rules, in the form of institutions, can serve to signal a country’s integration 
within international society.34 Most importantly, rules deflect gains into the periphery, 
ensuring that changes in the distribution of power and interests are reflected in 
nonessential areas. In all these, rules help to identify what state behaviour accords with 
the perpetuation of international society.  
 
Legitimating Principle 
The balance of power cannot preserve itself; therefore, an order needs rules to 
prevent revision of the core and regulate state activity in the periphery. Yet the existence 
of a rule does not guarantee obedience. Actors obey rules for two reasons: they respond 
to the threat of coercive force or they view the rule as somehow legitimate. Since states 
exist in anarchy, there is no higher authority to coerce states into compliance. Therefore, 
states will obey rules inasmuch as they see the rule as legitimate.35 But neither the 
balance of power nor international society have their own legitimacy, and a state will not 
obey rules in the name of either. Ultimately a state can only recognize one principle as 
legitimate: its own. To bind states, therefore, the legitimating principle of an international 
compact must align with that of the signatory states. 
International covenants made in accordance with the legitimating principle of a 
state represent an extension of a that state’s identity; upholding these rules is simply the 
                                                 
34
 For instance, membership in modern trade organizations or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty can 
indicate a country’s readiness to join, or rejoin, international society.  
35
 The importance of the legitimacy of international rules is essential to liberal arguments as well as 
theories of international law. “[I]n a community organized around rules, compliance is secured—to 
whatever degree it is—at least in part by perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is 
addressed…It becomes a crucial factor, however, in the capacity of any rule to secure compliance when, as 
in the international system, there are no other compliance-inducing mechanisms.” Thomas M. Franck, 
“Legitimacy in the International System,” The American Journal of International Law 82.4 (1988): 706.  
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logically appropriate action.36 Put another way, for a state to deny international covenants 
made in the name of its own legitimating principle denies its justification for existence 
and, therefore, risks domestic instability; as well, if a state views an international order as 
defending its particular mode of legitimacy internationally, the state will support the 
order to strengthen its domestic situation, deterring insurrection and the spread of an 
international revolutionary contagion.37  
 Still, no matter how well an order aligns with its legitimating principle, a state 
will still seize the opportunity for hegemony should it arise. To prevent this eventuality, 
states must ensure that no state ever has the capability to achieve hegemony—that is, 
states must ensure that there always exists a balance of power. And thus arise the three 
elements of order: a balance, a set of rules, and a principle. On these three does order 
stand: no more, no less. 
 
                                                 
36
 A principle of constructivism is that “the mode of political legitimacy defines the identity of the polity,” 
Bukovansky 3. Thus, upholding an order on the basis of a shared legitimating principle is simply an 
extension of a state’s constitutional identity. The formation of state identity has a long history in the 
constructivist literature; I have simplified their analysis here in order to render the concept theoretically 
useful. Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in 
International Political Culture, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 3. 
37
 The two points are the same; one is in the language of constructivism, the other rational choice theory. 
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Construction of Order 
Nothing in the distribution of capabilities, interests, or perceptions among states 
can predict the emergence of an international order.38 Its construction requires not only 
the recognition of shared goals but also diplomats skilled enough to weld an order 
together. As well, while structure will predict the longevity and ultimate success of an 
order, it cannot predict its character. The structure of international politics may require 
certain qualities for an order to succeed, but no necessity guarantees political action. 
 
Contingent Emergence and Character 
Orders tend to emerge out of major wars and the desire to avoid repeating the 
past’s mistakes. But major wars do not necessarily lead to the construction of 
international order: just as often, states retreat from their international responsibilities as 
they embrace them. The best explanation for the emergence of order is the wartime 
experience of the major powers, not the resulting distribution of power or interests.  
As structure cannot predict the emergence of an international order, neither can it 
predict its character. The wartime alliances and rhetoric will determine the contrived 
balances of power and the language justifying a postwar order. As well, the domestic 
situations of various states will affect the principle around which an order can be built.39 
Finally, and most importantly, individuals shape postwar settlements, bringing to 
                                                 
38
 That is, this thesis adopts a transformational approach to structure. David Dessler, “What’s at stake in the 
agent-structure debate?” International Organization 43.3 (1989), 467.  
39
 As constructivists note, constructing an order around a legitimating principle is not simply a process of 
“add[ing] up the various modes of domestic legitimacy among the great powers…structure (or culture) is 
constitutive [of states’] very identities,” Bukovansky, 35. That is, the principle of order which emerges is 
not simply the sum of great power legitimacies; indeed, the very process of constructing an order can affect 
domestic legitimacy—see this thesis’ discussion of Tsar Alexander in chapter three.  
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negotiations their own peculiar ideological and material interests, diplomatic 
eccentricities, and delusions for a future peace and their own historic legacy. 
The very unfolding of negotiations shapes the postwar order. For instance, to 
postpone negotiations of essential issues undermines the core-periphery distinction: to do 
otherwise than resolve these questions immediately implies the questions’ negotiability, 
but the essence of the core is that it is non-negotiable. The longer states delay the 
delineation of core and peripheral interests, the weaker an order becomes. 
In all ways, neither the emergence nor the character of an international order can 
be predicted ex ante. Its existence and qualities make sense only in retrospect. 
Nevertheless, while structure may not determine an order’s emergence, it does determine 
its success; those who would see their orders endure, therefore, are enjoined to take a full 
account of political realities when crafting an international order.  
 
Realism v. Utopianism 
Utopian visions have periodically dominated international politics.40 These 
visions have universally failed, unable or unwilling to account for the all the necessities 
of peace that reality requires. Utopianism may be defined, then, as the failure to 
recognize as essential one of the elements of international order. Most commonly this 
failure manifests in a denial of the importance of the balance of power, although equally 
utopian is the disregard for international norms or common bonds of legitimacy.  
                                                 
40
 Indeed, the discipline of international relations began in reaction to those utopian idiocies prevalent in the 
wake of the First World War; see E.H. Carr. Still, scholars tend to employ the words utopian and realist less 
as scientific labels than as derogatory epithets. In this thesis I have tried to identify what distinguishes a 
utopian from a realist vision of international order and to demonstrate and urge the superiority of the realist 
approach. Nevertheless, I do not follow the neorealists and conflate prediction with prescription: realism, as 
contrasted with utopianism, is an approach which recognizes the requirements reality imposes; it does not, 
and cannot, judge the merits of different national goals. In this sense, then, a realist approach is separate 
from a policy of Realpolitik, though the two often coincide.  
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Since order rests on three elements, utopian denials come in three varieties: 
utopian idealism denies the importance of a balance of power, believing that goodwill 
and international law can bind states to preserve the peace; utopian rationalism denies the 
importance of ideology, believing a stable order can be scientifically engineered on the 
basis of enlightened self-interest and clear rules without appeal to a moral law; and 
utopian constructivism denies the importance of rules and norms, believing peace can rest 
solely upon the ideological solidarity of a powerful bloc.41  
An international order will evince the character of its age: statesmen and recent 
events will determine its shape far more than the distribution of capabilities and interests. 
Ultimately, the construction of an international order will succeed insofar as it abandons 
utopian fantasies for a realistic appreciation of the requirements of international peace.  
 
The Status Quo Alliance 
Those states committed to oppose changes to a definite core in the name of a 
shared legitimating principle form a status quo alliance. An order will endure so long as a 
status quo alliance defends it.  
As a general rule, a status quo alliance best defends the core when the group of 
states possesses capabilities which overwhelm those of all other states; that is, the core is 
best defended by a defensive alliance stronger than any possible combination of other 
states.  
                                                 
41
 In modern times, liberal internationalists’ myopic embrace of rules and moral frameworks commits the 
sin of utopian idealism, failing to understand that law and legitimacy alone cannot uphold the status quo; 
by contrast, neoconservatives commit the sin of utopian constructivism, failing to understand that 
repudiating international law to spread the Liberal order will ultimately undermine the very foundation of 
the democratic peace. 
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Only those states that ascribe to the principle of legitimacy underpinning an order 
will defend it. Other states, though they may be content within the system, will not rise to 
defend a principle for which they have no affinity; simply put, a principle has no moral 
claim on those states which do not share it. A state will not defend an order based on a 
legitimating principle other than its own.42 
 
Collapse of Order 
Orders collapse when states fail to defend the status quo. Just as the construction 
of order can fall prey to three kinds of flaws, the collapse of order can arise out of three 
kinds of failure: a failure of balancing, a failure of legitimacy, and a failure of rules. Any 
one failure ensures the collapse of the entire system—and with it the collapse of 
international society.43 
 
The Three Failures 
The purpose of the contrived balance of power is to prevent change in the core. A 
failure to balance occurs when a state gains—or believes it has gained—the unbalanced 
capability to alter the core. Because to a large degree states can foresee the future 
capabilities of rising powers, of all kinds balancing failures should prove the least 
common. Assuming status quo states perceive threats and feel bound to oppose them, 
they usually do so. 
                                                 
42
 At least, it will not defend the order for any significant length of time. See the discussion of Castlereagh 
and Britain’s semi-withdrawal from the Continental balance. 
43
 To a degree any one failure involves the failure of all the others; thus, disentangling the particular 
failures causing an order to collapse is an imprecise art. Still, at the heart of any collapse lies a single 
failure, the correction of which would have prevented the order’s demise. 
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A legitimating principle binds states to the defense of an order and its rules, 
entangling the preservation of order with a state’s very identity. A failure of legitimacy, 
then, occurs when the principle underpinning order fails to morally oblige states to a 
defense of the core. Any principle which politicians can construe to support revision of 
the core will undermine order. Moreover, any principle that contradicts the identity of a 
state risks international order, since no state will support an order whose foundation 
challenges its legitimacy. A failure of legitimacy will also occur should a member of the 
status quo alliance betray the principle, for whatever reason. Finally, ideological change 
that alters a state’s domestic principle will drive the state to abandon a status quo alliance, 
since it no longer subscribes to the founding principle. 
The need for rules arises out of the imperfect perceptions of states. The purpose of 
rules within international order is to clearly demarcate the core from the periphery; that is, 
rules clarify the actions necessary to the defense of the status quo. A failure of rules, 
therefore, results when states cannot clearly determine what actions constitute a threat to 
international society. The proliferation of nonessential rules—that is, rules which do not 
identify and preserve the core—undermines international order. Thus, the multiplication 
of international laws can weaken an international order, since they tend rather to obscure 
than clarify status quo responsibilities. By the nature of the system, at any time there 
exist more rules than are part of an international order; this superfluity of rules tends to 
retard the proper functioning of order by confusing sovereigns as to which violations of 
international covenants constitute threats to international society. A statesman wishing to 
preserve international society should therefore strive to eliminate those rules not essential 
to order.  
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There is a fourth failure. Even if states possess the capability to defend the status 
quo, even if rules clearly identify a threat to the status quo, and even if a principle binds 
states to oppose this threat, still an order can collapse. If a majority of states determine to 
seek hegemony—that is, abandon international society—an order will collapse, since no 
status quo alliance will defend it.44 Moreover, even if a majority of states are satisfied 
with the status quo, if statesmen lack the will to oppose a threat to order, the best rules 
and principles and balances will not preserve it. But for all the possibility of these failures 
of will, neither is likely. If an order fails, it fails because an essential element disappears. 
 
The Collapse of Order in Historical Perspective 
Historically, orders have collapsed only when both power and ideas have changed; 
structural change along only one dimension tends not to cause upheaval. That is, a change 
in the distribution of power does not destroy an order unless accompanied by a change in 
the distribution of interests and ideas; the reverse also holds true. Generally, status quo 
powers can integrate rising states within the current order if they can appeal to a common 
principle in accordance with certain institutions: witness the peaceful incorporation of 
America into Atlantic society. Likewise, a shift in ideology without a shift in the balance 
of power tends not to upset the system; thus, the rise of Bolshevism in 1917 did not 
disrupt international peace since the Russians did not gain any power, and eventually they 
returned to international society.  
                                                 
44
 This eventuality should almost never occur: declining or static states tend to defend an order, while rising 
states tend to challenge it; for a majority of states to be rising, their gains in relative power would have to 
come at the expense of a minority of states; for a minority of states to be powerful enough that numerous 
states could grow at their expense would imply a predominance bordering on hegemony (or at least 
bipolarity), in either of which case the older superpowers should be more than potent enough to dispatch a 
threat from any number of upstart powers. 
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The Normative Precedence of International Order 
International society must exist for the realization of any international goal, 
excepting only hegemony and the destruction of a state.45 Save these, whatever his goals 
a statesman must act to preserve international society. As an international order is the 
only instrument whereby international society is stably sustained, statesmen should 
therefore strive to protect or create an international order.  
 To achieve any goal, a state must first secure its elementary goals. A state’s 
elementary goals are only secure under two conditions: either the state acts under a 
balance of power, or it achieves hegemony. A balance of power is only secure in an 
international society, and an international society in turn is only secure when maintained 
by an international order. Therefore, unless a state seeks hegemony, it must construct or 
preserve an international order to pursue any goals it may have.  
That great power order perpetuates unequal relations between major and minor 
powers does not justify its dissolution.46 International politics will always be dominated 
by a few powerful states; the justice of an order lies not in the equality of states under its 
rules but the fairness of its legitimating principle. Any state which subscribes to an 
order’s principle, therefore, should willingly defend it.  
                                                 
45
 “Thus, not only is order in world politics valuable, there is also a sense in which it is prior to other goals, 
such as that of justice,” Bull, 97. 
46
 Following St Augustine, “no political order can be a just order…order, therefore, presupposes human 
inequality.” Michael Loriaux, “The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology, and Moral 
Action in International Relations Thought,” International Studies Quarterly 36.4 (1992): 406. 
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3 
A strong union between the States on the principles we have 
announced will overcome the storm itself      
–Metternich 
 
The international order erected after the Napoleonic Wars was the strongest ever 
devised. Each part functioned in almost perfect tandem with every other; its balance of 
power, institutions, and legitimating principle reinforced each other without a 
contradiction. When Metternich constructed his system, he recognized the importance of 
the three elements of order; because of the strength of these elements established at its 
founding, his system endured for half a century, and ultimately the Vienna system 
collapsed only after an irreparable loss of legitimacy. 
During the Napoleonic wars France sought Continental hegemony, challenging 
the sovereignty of every state in Europe. Her attempt destroyed international society. 
1815 shows the necessity of international order: without an order, the society of European 
states degenerated into hegemonic war; with an international order, the society of 
European states enjoyed peace for half a century.47  
 
Metternich and the Construction of His System 
Into the chaos of Napoleonic Europe stepped Metternich.48 Both vilified and 
deified, Metternich defies all attempts at an impartial appraisal. Even those who belittle 
                                                 
47
 “The primary difference between the pre-1815 and the post-1815 era lies in the absence of a working 
international system in the former and its existence in the latter.” Schroeder, 126.  
48
 Historians often criticize Metternich for his perpetuation of an unjust regime and system. To the truth of 
this claim I do not care to speak: I use him only as an illustration of how to construct a stable international 
society, since his creation was, so far as I can tell, the most effective ever devised. I desire to discover the 
characteristics of stable international societies; whether the perpetuation of these societies is desirable, I 
leave alone. 
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him cannot ignore him. The quintessential diplomat, Metternich fashioned a system 
wherein the three essential components of order worked harmoniously together. The 
inception of the Vienna system illustrates two points: first, that in addition to balance of 
power an international order rests upon a legitimating principle and a set of rules; second, 
that the character of an international order is determined not by structure but by statesmen. 
By stressing principle and international law during the conduct of the war, Metternich 
laid the groundwork for the postwar order; at the Congress, Castlereagh’s failure and 
Metternich’s success at assembling a counterbalancing coalition demonstrates the 
impossibility of transforming a fortuitous into a contrived balance without an appeal to 
law and legitimacy; and his accommodation of France within European society ensured 
she would not revert to revisionism. The success of Metternich’s system is beyond 
question; what remains is to investigate how such a masterpiece came to be. 
 
Wartime Rhetoric 
Better than any other statesman, Metternich understood that the conduct of the 
war would determine the character of the postwar order. He also knew that Austrian 
survival depended on a postwar order that embraced Austrian existence as a necessity. 
Therefore, Metternich strove to ensure that Austria and the Coalition always acted in the 
name of principles consonant with the survival of the Habsburg monarchy and a 
conservative peace. 
During the war, Metternich took special care when extricating Austria from its 
alliance with Napoleon. Balance of power concerns dictated that Austria prevent 
Napoleon from establishing hegemony in Europe. Yet, Metternich could not simply 
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repudiate the Austrian commitment to France: with characteristic prescience, Metternich 
understood that to reject international law during the war would undermine any postwar 
order; moreover, the Austrian monarchy itself was founded upon the sanctity of 
covenants, the renunciation of which would provoke domestic instability. Wisely, 
Metternich realized that a stable international society would rest not only on a balance of 
power but on an ideological commitment to international law—that is, on an international 
order. “Before Austria enters a war it must secure not only its military but its moral 
position.”49 
 
Castlereagh, Metternich and the Balance of Power 
During the turmoil of the Napoleonic Wars a fortuitous balance formed to combat 
the possibility of French hegemony. But a fortuitous balance will not preserve the peace: 
a stable international society must rest upon a consciously constructed balance of power. 
In this endeavor Metternich had a comrade-in-arms, Lord Castlereagh, who “henceforth, 
saw his task in translating the fact of the alliance into a consciousness of its necessity.”50  
But a balance of power is never maintained by the demonstration of its necessity. 
The stability of international society requires more than a fortuitous balance of power; it 
requires an international order. Because an international order is more than a mere 
balance of power, its construction requires an appeal to greater purposes than the 
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 Metternich, qtd. in Kissinger (1964), who summarizes Metternich’s strategy thus: “Everything depended, 
therefore, not only on the defeat of Napoleon but on the manner in which it was achieved, not only on the 
creation of a coalition but also on the principle in the name of which it was to fight.” Kissinger (1964), 25.  
50
 Ibid., 87. Kissinger elaborates the point later in the text on page 147: “There exist two kinds of 
equilibrium then: a general equilibrium [fortuitous balance] which makes it risky for one power or group of 
powers to attempt to impose their will on the remainder; and a particular equilibrium [contrived balance] 
which defines the historical relation of certain powers among each other. The former is a deterrent against 
general war; the latter the condition of smooth co-operation.” In other words, a general (fortuitous) 
equilibrium makes international society possible; a particular (contrived) equilibrium makes society stable. 
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maintenance of the international equilibrium. This need explains why Castlereagh failed 
and why Metternich succeeded; it also explains why the final status quo alliance 
excluded Britain.  
Castlereagh tried to prove to states that they must unite against the threat of 
Russian predominance and revolutionary France. He failed. But Metternich did not. 
Kissinger pinpoints the difference between the two statesmen’s approaches: “if 
Castlereagh’s failure had proved that the equilibrium could not be achieved through a 
demonstration of its necessity, Metternich’s almost imperceptible complementary effort 
had created the moral framework for reopening the issue by an appeal to legitimacy.”51 
A state will not defend the balance of power for its own sake. The country which 
at first appears to contradict this dictum in fact confirms it: Britain would not defend the 
status quo in Europe. She would act to stop the emergence of a hegemon, but would not 
defend the Treaties; for domestic reasons Castlereagh could not commit to a defense of 
the Continental balance.  
Even the Balancer of Europe would not defend the balance of power. Without some 
principle tying her to other states, Britain retreated from the alliance of status quo states. 
 
A Legitimate Peace 
The purpose of the treaty52 was the reestablishment and preservation of that 
international society the Napoleonic wars had destroyed.53 To prevent a revisionist 
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 Kissinger (1956): 272.  
52
 Note: the post-Napoleonic system was built, not by Russia, the leading state in the system, but by Austria, 
by all accounts the weakest. In effect, Russia was constrained by the Concert without realizing it. This fact 
rebuts the theory in After Victory, for it implies postwar systems are not necessarily built by the most 
powerful states to institutionalize their gains, but by weaker states to hold back the stronger. In other words, 
there is no constitutional bargain—stronger states do not necessarily trade constraints for acquiescence.  
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challenge to international society, all major powers must view the status quo as legitimate, 
since any state that believes itself wronged by a peace will seek to revise the terms of that 
peace. In other words, defeated states must be successfully reincorporated into 
international society or else utterly destroyed. The victorious coalition had neither the 
will nor the desire to destroy France; therefore, it faced the challenge of her successful 
reincorporation into international society. Early in negotiations Metternich recognized 
this necessity; wisely, he did not seek to punish France for her role in the destruction of 
Europe.54 Instead, the Powers confined her to her historic boundaries, from which she 
could not object to the peace on grounds of principle. 
The great monarchies regarded their covenants with each other almost as holy, 
and they would not violate them on principle.55 As well, they recognized in that restive 
Republic to the west a mortal threat to absolutism; the regents therefore joined in united 
opposition to revision and Revolution, both embodied by France. For reasons of 
monarchic solidarity and domestic necessity, the emperors of the east joined together to 
quarantine the national disease.  
Still, conservative absolutism need not have underpinned the postwar order. 
Alexander I had long toyed with liberal schemes, including thoughts of a national 
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 Bridge and Bullen note its purpose “was to restore ‘those relations of reciprocal confidence and goodwill 
which the fatal effects of the Revolution and of the system of Conquest had for so long a time disturbed.” 
F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1815-1914 (London: 
Longman, 1980), 33. 
54
 “Metternich was firmly convinced that the period of order and stability that he hoped to inaugurate in 
Europe could only come out of a peace settlement which all the major Powers believed to be just.” Andrew 
Milne, Metternich (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975), 46. 
55
 “The monarchs of the autocratic monarchies regarded treaties, particularly those which they had 
concluded with each other, as binding personal commitments which their honour and duty towards God 
decreed that they must uphold” Bridge, 12. 
 30 
Poland.56 His turn toward reaction and zealotry resulted from individual influences upon 
his psyche,57 none of which were predictable, and certainly none of which were structural. 
Had Alexander not embraced conservative solidarity, Metternich was prepared to ally 
with France to contain the Russian behemoth. Indeed, Russia herself was prepared to ally 
with France against England.58 In other words, the formation of an absolutist order could 
not have been predicted ex ante, as other equally likely alliances could have 
materialized.59 They would not have been as stable, true: but therein lies the genius of 
Metternich, for the order he constructed was the best of all which might have arisen. 
  Metternich understood, perhaps better than any statesman before or since, the 
dictates of reality. Unlike Castlereagh, he did not embrace a utopian rationalism; rather, 
he understood that peace required not only a clear demonstration of the need for a 
balance of power, but a common ideology to hold the alliance together. He was a paragon 
of realist diplomacy.  
 
The Era of Metternich: the Long Peace 
The stability of an international order is determined by its ability to prevent 
change within the core. The Vienna system derived its unequalled success from the 
clarity of its rules, the solidity of its balance, and the solidarity of Powers around its 
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 Gulick notes that “to Vienna Alexander brought one of the crowning inconsistencies of all, a policy 
toward Poland which was conceived in terms of nationality and moral duty and was defended on equilibrist 
grounds.” Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and 
Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
1967), 190.  
57
 Most notable of these influences was the religious eccentric Madame de Krudener. Alexander I is 
infamous for his shifting moods: he “consorted first with liberals and ideologues and finally with 
conservatives and mystics.” Algernon Cecil, Metternich: A Study of his Period and Personality (London: 
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1947), 90. 
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 Bridge, 35. 
59
 In other words, the emergence of an absolutist order was determined almost entirely by 1st image 
variables; 3rd image variables played little or no role. Contingency is the word of the day.  
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central legitimating principle. Never since have states so successfully defended the status 
quo. 
 
The Quadruple and Holy Alliances 
As Gentz observed, Metternich and Castlereagh crafted the balance around three 
states which were “peaceful by necessity”—Austria, Prussia, and England.60 The Vienna 
settlement established borders such that neither Britain, Austria nor Prussia could realize 
gains on the Continent. Because any challenge to the status quo would come at their 
expense, these three states had vested interests in its defense.  
Nevertheless, the Quadruple Alliance served mainly to deter the possibility of 
Russian revisionism, the only goal to which England, lacking ideological ties with 
Austria and Prussia, would commit. Ultimately, not the Quadruple but the Holy Alliance 
defended the status quo.  
After his reactionary turn, Alexander I proposed a Holy Alliance among the 
conservative powers. Though initially an outgrowth of the Tsar’s eccentricities, the 
Continental empires embraced it as a buttress against nationalism and French designs. 
The Revolution, if it spread, promised to undermine the eastern monarchies. At its heart, 
the absolutist solidarity sprang from the dread of this Terror.61 In tandem with Austria, 
Russia desired nothing more than the perpetuation of the Vienna settlement.62 Thus 
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 Friedrich von Gentz, “Considerations on the Political System Now Existing in Europe,” in Metternich’s 
Europe, ed. Mack Walker (London: Macmillan, 1968), 84. 
61
 “Fear of the revolution kept them working in concert.” Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg 
Empire 1815-1918 (London: Longman, 1989), 16. 
62
 “His [Tsar Nicholas’] policies, in fact, were the same as those of Metternich: to preserve peace and the 
1815 treaties” Ibid., 18.  
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solidified the status quo alliance, a balance built by the conservative monarchs to sustain 
the principle of their existence.  
 
The Congress System and the Rules of European Diplomacy 
Rules strengthen an international order insofar as they clearly distinguish an 
immutable core from a negotiable periphery. The Vienna system laid out in indisputable 
terms the fixed necessities of international society.  
The borders established after the defeat of Napoleon were inviolate, the 
unquestioned foundation of international society.63 In fact, the Quadruple Alliance 
explicitly bound the allies to act should any state infringe any of the territorial provisions 
of the Second Treaty of Paris.64 In fact, so secure were the territorial settlements that the 
1815 divisions of Poland survived unaltered until the First World War.65 
The borders established at Paris were infrangible. To resolve other conflicts the 
statesmen established a system of European Congresses. Though they did not always 
function perfectly, these gatherings established the precedent for the peaceful resolution 
of conflict. 
 
A Century of Stability 
An international order comprises a contrived balance of power, a legitimating 
principle, and a set of rules. Metternich’s system contained all three: the balance of power 
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 “In 1815 the common obligation to uphold the treaty structure of Europe was given great emphasis by the 
victorious allies, who regarded the General Act of the Congress of Vienna as the foundation of European 
territorial order,” Bridge, 11.  
64
 Ibid., 34.  
65
 With the exception of Krakow; see the discussion of the collapse of Metternich’s order. Piotr Wandycz, 
The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984), 65.  
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was built around the three central satisfied states;66 the Holy Alliance manifested the 
legitimating principle of conservative absolutism; and the Congress system contained a 
set of rules including the inviolable strictures of the Treaties of Paris and the commitment 
to peaceful settlement of disputes at future Congresses. For decades the Conservative 
system functioned almost without flaw, and for the entire 19th century the five great 
powers coexisted, their number constant throughout. For 100 years European 
international society persisted unchanged. The feat has no rival. 
 
The Collapse of Metternich’s System 
For all its strength, Metternich’s system was not perfect—no human invention is. 
Britain produced difficulties, and her gradual retreat from direct involvement on the 
Continent forced Austria more and more into the arms of Russia. After the Congress of 
Troppau and the crisis in Naples, Britain largely abandoned the Congress system; 
moreover, the loss of Castlereagh left Metternich without a partner as committed as he to 
the preservation of European stability. The increasing reliance on the Russian alliance 
seriously narrowed Austria’s policy options, and by midcentury the system had ossified. 
Nonetheless, for all these difficulties, the system held firmly together for half a century, 
and society held for another half. Its decline should not obscure its remarkable success, 
still unequalled.  
The Conservative Order’s greatest strength was its legitimacy. Metternich’s 
masterpiece ultimately sprang not from a precise balance of power or perfectly 
functioning rules but from an exceptional dedication among the status quo states to a 
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 On the shift from a fortuitous to a contrived balance of power, Gentz noted that “[i]n place of the 
principle of equilibrium…there has succeeded a principle of general union,” Gentz 71-2.  
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common legitimating principle. His system failed only when the ideological ties binding 
together the Holy Alliance unraveled. Austria’s behaviour in Italy and Poland 
delegitimized her position as a model of absolutist rule in Europe, and the Crimean War 
betrayed the principle of monarchical solidarity underpinning the Holy Alliance. The 
national unification of Germany dealt the mortal blow to Metternich’s system, removing 
any possibility of a renewed status quo alliance built on a conservative principle. The 
collapse of the Conservative Order was a collapse of legitimacy.  
 
The Austrian Loss of Legitimacy 
In Italy Austria first felt her legitimacy slip. Metternich intended Italy to 
showcase Austria as an example to Europe.67 Instead, she was viewed as oppressive and 
backward. To his credit, Metternich, despite temptations otherwise, did not annex Italian 
territory, thereby preserving the borders established at his system’s inception. But 
Austria’s hand in Italy did nothing to strengthen her legitimacy or claims of enlightened 
absolutism.  
The annexation of Krakow in 1846 dealt another blow to Austrian legitimacy. 
Metternich built his system on the sanctity of compacts, most especially the 1815 
agreements establishing the postwar order. Yet, the annexation of this free city, however 
seemingly innocuous, dispelled the unbreakable bonds of Paris. If some clauses of the 
Treaty were negotiable, then all were. Throughout the Napoleonic wars Metternich had 
avoided at all costs violating preexisting agreements, despite that his forbearance vexed 
the Coalition and jeopardized the defeat of Napoleon. Yet, by altering the settlement in 
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 “Austria’s reputation for good government…in Italy, Austria could really present herself as a model for 
sovereigns to follow” Sked, 19.  
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Poland, Austria implied that the post-Napoleonic boundaries were not sacrosanct. The 
annexation of Krakow helped to undermine the distinction between immutable and 
negotiable interests, the only purpose of international rules.  
The Holy Alliance died in the Crimea. An international order persists only so long 
as an alliance of status quo states will defend it. Austria’s actions during the Crimean 
War destroyed the conservative solidarity of the Holy Alliance. The snub offended 
Russia most grievously, particularly after she had saved Austria in Hungary not a decade 
previously. The Crimea lay on the periphery as the Vienna system defined it, but 
unfortunately anything on the periphery is fair game. For all its strengths, Metternich’s 
system could not differentiate the core from the Continent; its inability to deal with 
potentially balance-shifting conflicts outside Europe weakened the post-Napoleonic order. 
This weakness enabled the fracture of the Holy Alliance, the failure of legitimacy, and 
the collapse of international order.  
 
Germany and the End of Order 
Though the Austrian loss of legitimacy and its betrayal of the Holy Alliance 
confronted Metternich’s system with difficulties, these difficulties were not 
insurmountable: the monarchs could reconcile, and Austria could restore its reputation. 
But the transformation of Prussia into a national state fatally undermined the foundation 
of the post-Napoleonic order.  
Any well-founded order must rest upon a legitimating principle common to a 
majority of its major powers. Metternich’s system rested upon the Holy Alliance’s shared 
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conservatism and opposition to the Revolution. After national unification, Germany could 
not defend an order in the name of a principle she had forsaken.  
Without an identity beyond its own aggrandizement,68 without a principle binding 
it to other states, Germany could not be part of a status quo alliance. Neither could it 
found a new international order: though Bismarck constructed the most intricate alliance 
network of the modern age, he could not institutionalize it—that is, he could never move 
international politics beyond mere anarchy into an international order, because he could 
not create rules and an underlying legitimacy to reinforce his contrived balance of power. 
His skillful balancing, for all its brilliance, lacked a unifying ideology, and so failed to 
create a system that would endure in his absence.69  
 
Conclusion 
While Metternich’s system expired in 1867, his society would endure much 
longer, and the generations of Europeans which enjoyed the long peace before the Great 
War owe their prosperity to this man.70 Vain and reactionary, Metternich bequeathed to 
Europe the greatest international order in the history of the world.  
After the fall of Metternich’s system, Bismarck admirably maintained a relatively 
stable European peace throughout his long tenure. But that peace could only be transitory, 
for no international order existed to reproduce it. The increasing instability of the period 
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 The legitimacy problem Germany created appears even in its own politics, since, “in contrast to other 
nation-states, Germany did not possess any integrating philosophical framework…[its] principal purpose 
was to increase its own power.” Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 169. 
69
 Bismarck’s “alliance system [was] a ‘conjuring trick…’expedien[t] rather than creativ[e]…Ultimately 
Bismarck’s alliance system failed because it did not remove the basic causes of international instability.” 
D.G. Williamson, Bismarck and Germany 1862-1890, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1998), 79-80.  
70
 “The four great-power conflicts of the mid century were not fought a l’outrance: the belligerents were 
concerned essentially with limited and localized objectives,” Bridge, 1. That is, the mid-nineteenth century 
wars did not destroy international society, because all states still recognized the elementary goals of the 
other great powers. 
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preceding the First World War testifies to the fragility of international society when 
unsupported by an international order.  
 To some extent, Metternich’s system was doomed to fail: absolute monarchy 
could not endure forever, and sooner or later history would sweep out its dated ideas. Had 
Metternich undertook to reconstitute the empire on principles more in line with the times, 
a different, perhaps more stable order might have emerged. But to ask of one man that he 
not only construct the most successful order in international history but also reform an 
empire burdened with an immense bureaucracy and inhabited by nations whose fiery 
competition two hundred years have not resolved, is to ask more than any mere mortal 
could possibly accomplish. Metternich was a man, not a god, and even a great man can 
accomplish only so much.  
Metternich established his system within the language of absolutism and 
conservatism in Europe, and so it survived for forty years; Bismarck never 
institutionalized his gains, and so they did not outlive his tenure. International society 
became increasingly unstable, until at last it collapsed in Sarajevo, 1914. However well 
Bismarck balanced power, he could not construct an order to preserve his Europe. And so 
his Europe died. 
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4 
The center and characteristic of the old order was that unstable 
thing which we used to call the ‘balance of power.’ 
–Wilson 
 
The preceding chapter broadly discussed Metternich and his system, perhaps the 
most impressive in history. I now turn to Wilson and his system, perhaps the worst ever 
devised, resulting in one of the most catastrophic eras ever to wrack humanity. Where 
Metternich’s system rested soundly on the principles of international politics, Wilson’s 
spurned the essential elements of order. In this folly it made possible one of history’s 
greatest tragedies.  
 
Wilson and the Construction of his System 
The Language of Victory 
The principle of any postwar order is the principle in the name of which the war 
was fought. During the Napoleonic Wars, Metternich meticulously articulated the Allies’ 
opposition in the language of conservative solidarity. Similarly, Wilson ensured that, 
following American entry into the war, the Allies consistently conducted the war in the 
name of his universal principles, as laid out in the Fourteen Points. These principles 
would form the foundation of the settlement at Versailles.  
Mindful of the indispensability of American involvement, French and British 
leaders tolerated Wilson’s idealism. They calculated that words were cheap, that 
whatever the wartime rhetoric the victors would negotiate peace in the traditional 
 39 
language of international politics.71 They were dead wrong. The Allies fell into a 
common trap: they did not understand that words are weapons, that the manner of victory 
is as important as its achievement. The old order had passed, and its rules and norms had 
passed with it; the new order would come with its own language and institutions, ones 
which would grow out of the conduct of the war.  
Yet the old powers also laid the groundwork of order. Whereas Metternich fought 
an ideology, the villain of the Great War was not the Revolution but Germany, whose 
culpability would follow it to Versailles. By vilifying Germany the Allies made her 
smooth reincorporation into international society almost impossible. Reparations were 
not a matter of material compensation: they were the manifestation of international 
justice.  
The enunciation of the Fourteen Points and their distribution across the Continent 
determined the normative framework for the postwar order. The war was fought for 
national self-determination, to make the world safe for democracy; the postwar order 
could only rest upon those same ideals. The inability of France and Britain to recognize 
the significance of Wilson’s wartime rhetoric laid the seeds of discord which would erupt 
at the conference; similarly, the vilification of Germany meant that any postwar terms 
would be harsh, complicating the much-needed reincorporation of Germany into 
international society.  
 
Pernicious Utopianism 
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 “During the war they [the Allied governments] worked out by secret treaties the main lines of a 
settlement based on the right of the victors to dictate changes in the status quo, and to make provision for 
their own security at the expense of the vanquished…Obviously the peace program outlined in the secret 
treaties was incompatible with Wilson’s program.” Raymond James Sontag, European Diplomatic History 
1871-1932 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1933), 258-9. 
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Too often Wilson sacrificed the concrete necessities of order for the chimera of a 
new and brighter world. Wilson faulted the balance of power for the outbreak of World 
War I, and so he determined to create a new order without that ancient, barbaric 
principle.72 His utopian idealism failed to understand the security needs of the European 
powers. France required a security guarantee—she could not face Germany alone.73 She 
received none. Britain still tried to pursue a policy of splendid isolation, unaware that 
Continental dynamics had changed irreversibly. Worse still, America retreated once more 
across the Atlantic, unwilling to accept the responsibilities of a major power. All failed to 
recognize the need for a concerted restraint of Germany. For all their failures, the 
politicians at Versailles constructed some semblance of a contrived balance. Germany 
was for all purposes disarmed and the Rhineland demilitarized. Yet, this balance did not 
reflect potential capabilities, a failure that would see the system swiftly undone. 
The balance, such as it was, extended to the seas. At the Washington Conference, 
Britain, the United States, and Japan settled on naval forces of the ratio 5:5:3. For a time, 
this agreement ended the naval arms race in the Pacific.74 The same agreement foisted 
naval parity with Italy upon France, much to the displeasure of Paris. Yet, like the 
Continental balance, the Naval Conference did not account for the potential power of 
states, and by 1936 states had ignored its strictures into obsolescence.  
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 “They fought to do away with an older order and to establish a new one, and the center and characteristic 
of the old order was that unstable thing which we used to call the ‘balance of power.’” Arthur S. Link, ed., 
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, v.53, November 9, 1918-January 11, 1919 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), 532.  
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 “French strategy was based on one major consideration: the need to find firm guarantees for security in 
the event of the revival of German power.” Richard Overy, Origins of the Second World War, 3rd ed. 
(Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2008), 18.  
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 The Washington Conference contrasts interestingly with the naval arms race in the North Sea pre-WWI. 
In the former, Britain yielded its maritime hegemony willingly; in the latter, it strove with Germany to the 
end. I suspect the difference results from a) states can more easily accept declining power in multipolar 
systems; b) the conference was after WWI, when Britain was exhausted; and c) the United States is a much 
more attractive rival than Germany. 
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Delayed Demarcation 
Wilson forwent resolution of essential questions in order to ensure the passage of 
his pet projects. But this delay violates a fundamental maxim of the construction of 
international orders: states must resolve questions concerning the core immediately, lest 
the delay imply the questions’ negotiability.75  
The Vienna settlement partitioned Poland and firmly identified the new 
boundaries as inviolable. By the end of the Paris Peace Conference, no one knew quite 
where Poland began.76 In fact, the Treaty of Versailles was signed with scarcely a single 
border resolved east of Vienna.  
Of all these unresolved problems, perhaps the most difficult was Austria-Hungary. 
The Habsburgs may have weathered the war, but they could not survive the peace. Past 
settlements had seen the reconstitution of the monarchy; Versailles would see its long-
awaited demise. The organizing principle of the empire fundamentally contradicted the 
principle of national self-determination Wilson so vehemently pronounced at Versailles. 
Austria-Hungary bore no more guilt than Germany for the war; yet, where the one 
survived, the other was parceled into half a dozen pieces—pieces whose borders lacked 
any clear definition. 
The problem typifies the Versailles settlement: the diplomats failed to settle 
questions of vital importance, delaying them for later discussion—all in order secure the 
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 Ironically, Wilson insisted upon the establishment of the League during the Conference because he and 
his opponents partially recognized this same maxim: “for they knew well that if it [the League] were left to 
some future conference, after all the essential questions in the war with Germany had been settled, it would 
come to nothing: it would be talked to death.” Ray Stannard Baker, What Wilson Did at Paris (Garden City: 
Doubleday, Page & Company, 1919), 39. 
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 Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 
1919 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 435.  
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League of Nations and other idealistic fantasies. The ideological blinders with which 
Wilson entered Paris and upon which the war had been fought hamstrung the peace 
negotiations. Moreover, Wilson’s blind utopian idealism sacrificed the essentials of 
international order for the ephemera of a new way of politics. The eventual settlement 
created an order with a weak balance of power, latent legitimacy conflicts, and 
underspecified rules. The system could not endure.  
 
The Era of Wilson and Versailles: the Interwar Period 
From its inception the Versailles system encountered difficulty. The balance of 
power required Anglo-French solidarity against a German resurgence. Yet, rather than 
accept the necessity of alliance with France Britain instead sought to pursue its traditional 
role as an insular balancer.77 As well, Europe saw the rise of rival ideologies, and Italy 
fell under the Duce’s sway. Still, the rise of a hostile ideology alone does not necessitate 
the collapse of an international order: after all, Italy became a revisionist state only after 
the rise of Hitler’s Germany.78 A shifting distribution of power is as important as 
ideological transformation. Had Wilson and the victors constructed a superior system, 
one with stronger rules, a balance of power, and, most importantly, a sound legitimating 
principle, their order might have endured. 
 
The Impossibility of National Self-Determination 
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 France was “disappointed at the way in which Britain had withdrawn from direct involvement in Europe 
at the end of the war,” Overy, 18. 
78
 This argument lets alone the likely valid claim that the settlement itself enabled the rise of Fascist 
ideology. Davidson (2006) makes the sound point that Italian revisionism only followed the rise of 
Germany, that is, a shift in both power and ideology. 
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The principle of national self-determination is irreconcilable with international 
order. National self-determination assets that a nation has the right to self government, 
and that every person has a nation. Therefore, an order based on this principle must 
embrace everyone, that is, there exists nothing outside an international order based on 
national self-determination. If nothing exists outside an order, then there is no periphery, 
that is, there are no negotiable interests. As a state increases its power, it will desire to 
realize gains; but if there are no negotiable interests, there are no gains for it to realize 
within international society; the state will therefore become revisionist. In effect, national 
self-determination removes the dynamic stability of international order. Without a 
periphery on which to bargain, any significant change disrupts the balance of power and 
engenders a revisionist threat to international society.  
Furthermore, national self-determination is incompatible with territorial 
sovereignty. The dispersion of nations does not coincide with geographic boundaries; any 
political divisions of territory necessarily will exclude some nationals and include some 
foreigners. But if these foreigners have a right to their own state, then they can attempt to 
revise the status quo within the language of its legitimating principle; that is, the 
language of national self-determination serves not to uphold the status quo but to 
delegitimize it. In asserting a principle of national self-determination, Wilson attempted 
to reorganize world politics along a new ordering principle; in fact, he laid the foundation 
for a revisionist challenge to his system.  
 
Crisis and Impotence 
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In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria. Legally, the League bound its members to 
oppose aggression,79 but without a balance in the Far East, the League had only moral 
suasion and international law to oppose Japan. Even the rules of the League proved 
ineffective—without a clear outline of the steps to counter aggression, neither America 
nor Britain would oppose Japan, each suspecting the other of negligent buck-passing. No 
status quo alliance arose; the great powers did nothing. 
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 “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territoria integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League,” Walworth, 565. 
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The Collapse of Wilson’s System 
Wilson’s system fell prey to all three failures of order. So total was its demise that 
retrospective disentanglement of its many failures is almost impossible.  
Anarchy is a self-help system; states will not depend upon collective security for 
their safety. Yet, the politicians at Versailles made almost no arrangements for their 
mutual defense. France required an alliance with Britain; it settled for third-rate 
Continental friendships. In 1935, a paper alliance of Britain, the USSR, Italy and France 
agreed to contain Germany; in reality, it had no force whatsoever, since no one wanted 
the Red Army to enter central Europe and British isolationism prevented action. Even 
more absurdly, the great powers deluded themselves into the belief that Poland could help 
to counterbalance Germany.80 This wishful thinking was nothing more than willful 
blindness. At Munich, the great powers would not risk Continental war to defend 
Czechoslovakia. After the Nazi-Soviet pact, Russia would not help Britain and France; 
what’s more, both of the Western European powers lacked the will to fight for a distant 
peace.81 After Vienna, statesmen knew the commitments necessary to maintain 
equilibrium, and they constructed alliances accordingly. Versailles let the powers drift 
apart, each uncertain how to uphold the balance.  
As well, the flaws latent in the principle of national self-determination enabled 
German revision and prevented the formation of a status quo alliance. Instead of 
preserving international society, the principle of legitimacy articulated at Versailles 
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 “the role of a counterweight to Germany would now fall to east-central Europe, an ‘eastern barrier’ in 
which Poland would be ‘le meilleur rampart.’” Piotr Wandycz, “The Polish Question,” in The Treaty of 
Versailles: a Reassessment After 75 Years, ed. Manfred Boemeke et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 320.  
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 “no effective aid would come from Russia…‘nothing that France or [Britain] could do could possibly 
save Czechoslovakia’…to avert war the Sudeten Germans should be given to Germany,” Raymond J. 
Sontag, A Broken World: 1919-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 339.  
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undermined it. The contradictory claims to which the principle of self-determination gave 
rise legitimated German demands in Czechoslovakia. Versailles established national self-
determination as the language of justification, but within this language the Western 
powers could not justify opposition to Hitler.82 
Finally, the Versailles system fell for its inability to identify Hitler as a revisionist 
threat. Because nothing clearly defined the core of international society, the Western 
powers could not determine whether the gains Germany sought constituted a threat to the 
status quo. A policy of appeasement can function, but only if that policy permits no gains 
outside the periphery: appeasement without delineation of core and peripheral interests is 
nothing more than cowardice. Confounded by the contradictions of their own principles, 
blind to the demands of the balance of power, and without any clear conception of their 
core interests, the leaders of the Western powers sought shelter in a policy of 
appeasement. 
Eventually a status quo alliance emerged to defend the core. But the Allied stand 
at Poland was too little, too late. By 1939, the western democracies had already allowed 
the balance of power to collapse, had already allowed the core to disintegrate.83 They 
recognized that an attack upon Poland was an attack upon the core of international 
society; they failed to realize that the betrayal of Czechoslovakia a year before had 
already destroyed international order and the only hope for peace.  
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 “Stronger than this [anxiety to avoid war] was the feeling that in the Sudeten question they had a weak 
moral case…The Sudetens were indisputably Germans; therefore they should be included in 
Germany…The Czechs themselves had contributed unconsciously to this frame of mind by insisting that 
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 “[T]here was a growing contradiction between the existing international system and the reality of 
power.” Overy, 10.  
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Conclusion 
By all accounts the Allies at Versailles had an easier task than the Alliance at 
Vienna: the First World War far exceeded the brutality of the Napoleonic Wars, and even 
the defeated powers desired peace. Liberalism was ascendant and unified all the victors, 
and a status quo alliance was ready at hand. Yet in 1919 the politicians failed, and peace 
lasted less than two decades; in 1815, the statesmen succeeded, and the peace they 
inaugurated lasted almost a century. 
Wilson thought the First World War would be the last. He planned to eliminate 
Old World diplomacy; now, American-style idealism would govern the world. Collective 
security, not the balance of power, would henceforth uphold international society, and 
beyond any shade of doubt a golden age of peace would dawn. Instead came darkness at 
noon and the twilight of the gods, the collapse of order and the obliteration of the 
European powers.  
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5 
Each [state] may and should for the sake of its own security 
demand that the others enter with it into a constitution similar to 
the civil constitution, for under such a constitution each can be 
secure in his right. 
–Kant 
 
International politics occur either in a state of nature or a state of nations, a state 
of war or a state of peace. The structure of international relations creates the opportunity 
for either to emerge, but the course of history hinges upon the choices of individual 
statesmen.  
The safeguards of peace, the elements of order, do not differ across time. They 
derive from the eternal constraints of anarchy and the inherent nature of actors. Whenever 
it lasts, peace endures for the same reasons. The democratic peace, then, simply 
exemplifies a working international order; it is ultimately no different from the absolutist 
peace of the 19th century. Metternich’s system rested upon the principle of conservatism, 
perhaps the soundest principle to underlie an international order: the stability of an order 
is defined by its ability to resist change, and resistance to change is the definition of 
conservatism. Still, this aspect addresses only the static stability of international orders. 
Whether Liberalism is a more dynamic system—that is, it allows redefinition of the core 
without major upheaval—requires further study.  
Indeed, the Liberal order has endured longer than any other. This longevity might 
reflect the greater justice of its governments, their internal stability strengthening the 
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larger international order. The question then arises—if the Liberal order is the best 
possible order, will the current international society ever fall? 
 Perhaps. After all, Wilson’s order was built on liberal ideals, and it fell. 
Fortunately, events afforded liberalism a second chance. The post-1945 Liberal Order 
corrected the mistakes of its predecessor: the Eastern and Western blocs were expressly 
inviolable, and each side formed alliances around a common ideology, both with the 
purpose of defending the status quo. But an order rests on more than principle. While the 
liberal order may rest comfortably on its legitimacy, it must eternally safeguard the other 
elements of international stability.  
These elements are even now in doubt. In modern times, the difficulties presented 
by Iranian acquisition of nuclear arms may represent a failure of rules, since the major 
powers have not agreed whether such acquisition constitutes a threat to the international 
system. Likewise, the unfettered expansion of NATO obscures rather than clarifies the 
interests that the Western alliance will defend. The delegation of international security to 
the U.N. Security Council also disrupts international politics: since a status quo alliance 
can only contain states with a shared legitimating principle, neither Russia nor China will 
defend world order.  
The Versailles system collapsed when the balance of power failed. But defenders 
of the Liberal order should not therefore grow complacent in their overwhelming 
capabilities, nor should they cease to tend the ideational ties binding the West together. 
Most importantly of all, the Liberal powers must never allow the rules of international 
politics to obscure their core interests. If the Liberal Order is to endure, its defenders 
must maintain a balance of power, cultivate democratic solidarity, and clarify the core of 
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interstate politics. Only these will preserve international society and the peace of nations. 
To do less is to lose all.  
 And in the past, men have lost all. The failure to understand the requirements of 
peace, to accurately appraise reality, has cost millions of lives and untold treasure. 
Politicians may deny necessity, but they may not deny its consequences: when we despise 
reality, we risk everything. The true statesman is not the idealist who tries to remake the 
world, but the realist who makes the best of the world he has been given. 
States differ from men, and from this difference arises the possibility of their 
ungoverned society. But that society cannot sustain itself: for it to endure, men must 
construct an order to preserve it, to bind states to its defense. We cannot predict this 
outcome from the structure of international politics: states as often clash in titanic 
struggle as unite in well-ordered concord. The emergence of the state of nations from the 
state of nature, of harmony on Olympus, depends on human beings and all their 
unfathomable peculiarities. Whatever are the gods, their ways are made by men.  
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Appendix: Definitions 
 
Actor – the basic ontological unit of this model, typically identified with the state. It has 
three attributes: 
1) capabilities – an actor can effect an outcome. Capabilities are a function of 
resources and technology. An actor has finite capabilities. 
2) interests – an actor desires to effect an outcome. Interests are a function of 
values and identity. An actor has infinite interests. 
3) perceptions – an actor recognizes the capabilities and interests of itself and 
others. Perceptions are a function of actual capabilities and interests and 
processing power. To some degree an actor always misperceives the world. 
 
Anarchy – the absence of hierarchy. (Anarchy implies neither disorder nor chaos.) 
 
Balance of Power – neutralization of capabilities, i.e., the removal of the capability or the 
interest (deterrence) to effect an outcome. 
Balance of Power, Fortuitous – usually accidental neutralization of capabilities 
that would alter the number of states 
Balance of Power, Contrived – conscious neutralization of capabilities that would 
alter the core. 
 
Core – set of interests the change in any one of which will jeopardize the elementary 
goals of at least one major power. 
 
Elementary Goals (of states) – “goals stand out as elementary or primary, inasmuch as 
their fulfillment in some measure is a condition not merely of this or that sort of 
social life, but of social life as such…any other goals a society may set for itself 
presuppose the realization of these goals in some degree.”84 They include survival, 
property, and promise-keeping. This analysis focuses on survival. 
 
International Society – set of states which mutually respect elementary goals. (Major war 
is impossible in an international society.) 
 
Legitimating Principle – principle by which the use of force is justified. 
 
Major Power – any actor that can be existentially threatened only by a coalition 
containing at least one other major power.  
 
Major War – a war which threatens the existence of a major power. (The existence of a 
major power includes its existence as a major power.) 
 
Norm – expectation of behaviour; in the terms here employed, a norm is the perception of 
future action. (Since norms are reducible to perceptions, they do not have an 
ontological status independent of actors.) 
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 Bull, 4. I have not included in this definition all which Bull lists, since his catalog exceeds mere 
comprehension to include goals by no means essential to all others.  
 52 
 
Periphery – set of interests which are negotiable, that is, change in any one does not 
jeopardize the elementary goals of a major power 
 
State of Peace – the state of nations, that is, international society, wherein major war is 
impossible. A state of peace implies not harmony of relations but treatment of 
elementary goals as inviolate. 
 
State of War – the state of nature; major war is possible. A state of war implies that all 
interstate politics are conducted under the shadow of existential threats. 
 
(International) Structure – the relationship of actors to each other, that is, the distribution 
of capabilities, interests, and perceptions across units. (Since actors are the sole 
ontological unit in this model, structure can contain nothing else.) 
 
(International) System – pattern of interstate relations. (The English School traditionally 
distinguishes an international system from an international society.) 
 
Utopian (vision of international order) – denial of the importance of an essential element 
of order.  
Utopian idealism – denial of the importance of the balance of power 
Utopian rationalism – denial of the importance of a legitimating principle 
Utopian constructivism – denial of the importance of a set of rules 
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